The Honorable John L. Mica, Chairman
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure – Aviation
Hearing on the  9/11 Commission’s Report
August 25, 2004, 10:00 am

Statement for the Record:

Dear Members of the Committee:

The Airline Pilots Security Alliance is grateful for the opportunity to present to this important committee our views on the state of our nation’s aviation security system.  We thank you for continuing to work through recess to give measured consideration to the 9/11 Commission’s report on what must be done to prevent future terrorist attacks against our country, and we appreciate the opportunity to highlight our concerns regarding continuing vulnerabilities in the U.S. commercial aviation sector. 

As some of you know, APSA was formed in the wake of 9/11 and has since become a leading voice on aviation security matters.  Our all-volunteer organization, representing pilots from every major U.S. airline, has been instrumental in crafting several key pieces of aviation security legislation.  Our expertise has been called upon by personnel at the Federal Aviation Administration and the Departments of Transportation and Justice.  We have also briefed numerous Congressional staff and members – including some serving on this committee - on important aviation security matters.   

APSA today seeks to articulate concerns about commercial aviation’s continued vulnerability to terrorist threats as seen through the eyes of flight crew.  Many of America’s commercial airline pilots are gravely concerned that, despite major upgrades to our nation’s multi-tiered aviation security system since September 2001, we are still susceptible to 9/11- style attacks. 

Tier One:  Passenger and Carry-On Baggage Screening

At the first tier of our multi-tiered system is the screening of passengers and their baggage which accompanies them in the cabins of our aircraft.  This tier of the security system failed miserably on 9/11, and considerable resources have been spent to address deficiencies that allowed suspected terrorists and illegal items to make their way aboard at least four aircraft on one single fateful day.  The security screener workforce has been federalized and more stringent passenger and baggage screening methods have been implemented.  Nevertheless, a post 9/11 General Accounting Office report revealed that security failure rates are not markedly better than they were prior to 9/11, when one FAA inspector indicated he was able to sneak weapons passed airport security up to 90% of the time. 

Even the most diligent security screeners can miss banned items.  Metal detectors and x-ray machines remain the predominant technologies used to screen passengers and carry-on luggage, respectively, and both suffer from key limitations.  For example, an entire class of readily available composite weapons, including carbon-fiber knives, are essentially undetectable using these conventional screening technologies.  Plastic explosives are equally elusive to metal detectors and x-rays, and may only have a chance of being picked up by secondary screening with a trace detection wand or other machine that screens for chemical signatures.   

The pre-screening of airline passengers through the use of terrorist ‘watch lists’ has proven equally problematic, typified by the Transportation Security Administration’s failure to place Osama Bin Laden on its airline terrorist watch list, and by its inclusion of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) on a similar list. 

In short, despite billions of taxpayers dollars that have been spent on improving passenger and carry-on baggage screening, this first, critical tier of airline security remains alarming porous. 

Tier Two:  A More Robust Federal Air Marshal Program and Fortified Cockpit Doors

A second tier of airline security that was virtually nonexistent on 9/11 has been added to our system.  This second tier seeks to address the consequences of a breakdown of the first-tier of the system, where terrorists and/or their weapons have made their way onboard commercial aircraft.  At this point, when screening on the ground has failed, airline pilots and passengers must count on the presence of onboard Federal Air Marshals and a reinforced cockpit door to thwart an attack.  None of the aircraft targeted on 9/11 had air marshals onboard – the size of the force was reportedly less than 50 at the time of the attacks – and none of the aircraft had fortified cockpit doors. 

Our government has sought to significantly expand the Federal Air Marshal program in the wake of 9/11, and airline pilots are largely supportive of these efforts.  However, the number of flights that remain unprotected by air marshals is disturbingly high.  While the exact number of air marshals in the system today is classified, the Washington Times recently reported that the current force is only able to protect about 5% of the 35,000 daily commercial flights in our air space.  To protect 85% of our daily flights would require an annual budget of almost $11 B and tens of thousands of additional air marshals.  Given these economics, it is highly unlikely that the Federal Air Marshal Program will ever protect a significant number of flights. 

Without air marshals on board, a fortified cockpit door is the only remaining layer in this second-tier of the airline security system.  While fortified cockpit doors are helpful, they are not failsafe.  Cockpit doors are today cautiously but routinely opened during flight to allow flight crew to receive a meal, use the lavatory, accept relief pilots on international flights, and move around enough to prevent medical stress on long-haul flights.  A terrorist has only to rush the cockpit once the door is opened to gain control of the airliner.  Moreover, no door is impenetrable.  Some international flights are more than six hours from the nearest point of landing, giving ample time for a motivated group of terrorists to work on breaching the door.  Fortified doors have already been defeated by a cleaning crew with a food cart, and by a drunken passenger on an international flight soon after 9/11. 

While federal air marshals and reinforced cockpit doors are critical additions to the aviation security system, statistics and physics say they may fail to protect an airliner from being commandeered by suicidal terrorists.  For this reason, many commercial pilots argue a third tier of aviation security is essential to preventing another 9/11 style attack.  The armed defense of the cockpit constitutes this third, and perhaps most vital, line of defense against terrorists.

Tier Three: The Federal Flight Deck Officer Program

In 2002, the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act was passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority in Congress, mandating the Department of Homeland Security to cross-train professional pilots as Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) to protect their aircraft.  Congress rightly concluded a security layer complimentary to the air marshals was necessary to provide a robust defense aboard our airliners. 

Unfortunately, the Transportation Security Administration, charged with designing and implementing the FFDO program, has trained fewer than 3% of 95,000 eligible commercial airline pilots as federal flight deck officers.  We estimate only 5% of daily domestic flights are protected by even one armed pilot, and less than one percent would be lucky enough to be protected by two. 

Many airline pilots feel a robust FFDO program is the single most important and cost effective security measure we could take to prevent another 9/11.  The ten-year cost to train and maintain a few thousand air marshals in the current program is $6 billion, yet these marshals reportedly protect only 5% of our flights.  The ten-year cost to train and maintain a volunteer force of 40,000 Federal Flight Deck Officers is $170 million -- 97% less -- and would protect at least 85-90% of our flights. In other words, by spending 3% more money, we could protect 85% more flights.

But these same pilots are dissuaded from volunteering for the program for a number of reasons.  First, the TSA has unilaterally added multiple layers of redundant psychiatric and background screening for pilots already vetted for an average of ten years to fly commercial airliners.  TSA has then used these screens to reject a very large contingent of qualified pilots, including hundreds former law enforcement officers, firearms instructors and military pilots.  These rejections, combined with a veiled threat to share its subjective judgments of a pilot’s fitness with the FAA and the pilot’s employer, have discouraged volunteers.  Tens of thousands of previously willing pilots now refuse to apply to the FFDO program.  Without a dramatic increase in new volunteers, the future of this critical program or its ability to provide a robust defense is in doubt.

Second, the TSA requires FFDOs to transport firearms in steel gun safes – a procedure rejected by every other law enforcement agency as both cumbersome and unsafe.  It is especially cumbersome for a pilot, moving among different airports, airplanes and cities across the country each day, carrying such an unwieldy item in addition to the pilot’s flight equipment and luggage.  This requirement also discourages volunteers by the thousands.

Third, agreements allowing Federal Flight Deck Officers to carry weapons into other countries have not been negotiated, so no international flights are protected by FFDO’s and pilots who fly internationally are summarily rejected from the program. 

Congressman Wilson has introduced the Cockpit Security Technical Corrections and Improvements Act (HR 4126) to streamline and standardize the FFDO program, to encourage volunteers and deploy a robust defensive capability on our aircraft.  We estimate, if this bill is passed, tens of thousands of pilots will finally apply for training as federal officers, and will protect the vast majority of our commercial airliners, 24/7, asking no compensation for providing this vital service.

Tier Four:  The Last Resort

Failing to protect the cockpit with a robust FFDO program leaves just one final line of defense – a last resort to prevent another 9/11.  The military has spent millions training and arming its pilots with missiles to shoot down innocent Americans in hijacked airliners.  If the military can react quickly enough, there is no doubt an air-to-air missile will effectively destroy a commercial airliner.  In that event, it will be difficult to explain why a fighter pilot was given a missile to shoot down an innocent airliner, while his colleague in the airliner was obstructed from having a pistol.

Of all the layers of security, repairing the FFDO program is the easiest, cheapest, and quickest means of reducing the chance future airline hijackings will succeed.  For our maximum safety, we must encourage maximum participation in this critical program.

As the American people look to their political leaders for urgent and courageous action, we urge you to work quickly to pass the Cockpit Security Technical Corrections and Improvements Act (HR 4126) to improve the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program and encourage volunteers.
 
We would appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee in future hearings to expand on our findings and request these comments be read into the record.  We applaud your dedicated work to improve airline security and stand ready to assist you whenever needed. 

Respectfully,