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| APSA’s Testimony to the DHS Inspector General |
AIRLINE PILOTS SECURITY ALLIANCE MS. KATHERINE MCPHERSON MARCH 22, 2005 STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD: The Airline Pilots Security Alliance (APSA) is grateful for the opportunity to present to the Inspector General our views on the state of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program. We appreciate the opportunity to highlight our concerns regarding continuing structural, procedural, and managerial problems in the program, and to provide recommendations to improve this vital and cost-effective defensive and deterrent layer of airline security. Many of America’s commercial airline pilots are gravely concerned that the Program suffers from general dysfunction that discourages and disqualifies volunteers, reduces safety, and increases costs -- ultimately resulting in increased susceptibility to 9/11- style attacks. APSA was formed in the wake of 9/11 to provide unbiased, nonpartisan expert guidance and information to policymakers and the public on aviation security issues, and has since become a leading voice in this arena. Our all-volunteer organization, representing thousands of pilots from every major U.S. airline, has been instrumental in crafting several key pieces of aviation security legislation. Our expertise has been called upon by personnel at the Federal Aviation Administration and the Departments of Transportation and Justice. We have also briefed numerous members of Congress and their staff on important aviation security matters. While many other organizations and entities have articulated positions on these matters, APSA Abstract After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, due in part to the appeals of large numbers of commercial airline pilots, debate began in Congress on the arming of pilots against acts of air piracy. The Bush Administration and the airline managements, through their lobbying voice, the Air Transport Association, generally opposed such measures, but, ultimately, the pilots’ arguments were persuasive. The result was several successive pieces of legislation mandating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implement a program to cross train volunteer pilots as sworn federal officers to defend their airliners. The law establishing the FFDO Program was clearly but broadly written, leaving the TSA latitude to develop and implement the program as it saw fit. Rather than using its latitude to develop an FFDO program that conformed to established law enforcement models, the TSA instead dismissed the recommendations and input from pilots with backgrounds in law enforcement and ultimately produced a vastly inferior program to the one envisioned by Congress and pilots alike. Specifically, the TSA instituted a burdensome applications process and non-standard (and some would argue patently unsafe) weapons carriage protocols, both of which served to deter potential program applicants. In short, as a result of onerous application and operating procedures, policies requiring pilots to transport firearms off-body, and the summary exclusion of all international pilots, between 50,000 and 60,000 pilots who previously expressed interest in becoming FFDOs have chosen to not participate in the Program. Among those who remain, an unreasonably large number have been found “unfit” for the program, based on psychological evaluations completely dissimilar from proven models used for fifty years to screen law enforcement officers and federal agents for the Federal Air Marshal Service, FBI, CIA, Department of Defense and state and local law enforcement agencies. Contrary to public statements by the TSA, there remains substantial interest among pilots in the FFDO program. But significant numbers of applicants will not volunteer until the program is reformed. Specifically, pilots want a program that conforms to standard law enforcement protocols and procedures, and accepts reasonable input from pilot volunteers on program structure and management. APSA firmly believes these simple but fundamental changes would vastly improve and expand the FFDO program. Background The armed protection of a commercial aircraft cockpit is neither a new concept nor a new practice. In fact, commercial pilots routinely carried firearms on the flight deck for decades, principally to protect the US Mail. Indeed, this practice continued through at least the mid 1980s without any adverse safety events. Only when airport security enhancements were made in the wake of a 1987 incident were pilots effectivelyprohibited from carrying firearms on their aircraft.1 There were periodic but quiet discussions within the aviation and security communities about the potential risks and benefits of protecting the cockpit of commercial airliners throughout the 1990s, particularly as the number of active air marshals dwindled from a peak of 400 in 1987 to just 33 on the morning of September 11, 2001. But it took the events of September 11 to thrust the once quiet debate into the public and policy spotlight. New calls to arm pilots were supported by 75% of the public and by 85% of airline pilots. When it invited the public to comment on the issue, the FAA received over 5,000 comments supporting the idea. Despite widespread public support, the Bush Administration and airline managements opposed an armed pilot program, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) refused to implement one when given the discretion to do so in initial legislation passed in November 2001. Those opposed to the program cited possible risk to an aircraft’s structural integrity from firearms discharges, though aircraft manufacturers’ studies had concluded this risk was negligible. Likewise, the argument seemed illogical, given the Administration’s staunch support for a large increase in armed air marshals, who would presumably expose the aircraft to the very same errant discharge risks that caused such concern with armed pilots. The argument also seemed disingenuous, given that every year airlines allow thousands of federal, state or local law enforcement officers, in or out of their jurisdictions, to routinely carry a loaded, concealed firearm Another argument advanced by officials unfamiliar with airline operations was that “pilots should Finally, pilots and independent security experts pointed out that even with a new, federalized screener workforce, and new screening technology deployment, the airport security system for screening both passengers and their baggage would remain porous. Given the impossibility of designing, implementing and financing a completely failsafe airport security system, pilots argued there must be some contingency for defending the airliner for times when the system fails. Air marshals appeared to be the answer, but the cost of deploying enough air marshals to provide real protection was prohibitive. In short, without a robust armed pilot program, the country would still be without a last line of defense against another 9/11, short of having an Air Force fighter jet shoot down a civilian airliner. Ultimately, arguments supporting armed pilots proved so compelling that follow-on legislation requiring the TSA to establish the FFDO Program passed out of Congress with an overwhelming bipartisan majority. An original version of the measure providing for arming only 2% of airline pilots in a five-year “test program” was deliberately struck from the bill, the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act, prior to the vote. Congress concluded such a small number of armed pilots would not be an adequate deterrent or defense against terrorist attacks, and they sought a far more robust, permanent program. Unfortunately, the program that has since been implemented by the TSA is anything but robust. Indeed, the program suffers from major structural, procedural, organizational and managerial deficiencies, all of which have served to deter volunteers. APSA remains committed to reforming the program to address the most important of these deficiencies, which can be summarized as follows:
FFDO Program Deficiencies Burdensome, Redundant, Prejudicial Screening There is strong anecdotal evidence suggesting a deep, institutional opposition to the FFDO program within the TSA. Nowhere is that opposition illustrated more dramatically than in the FFDO applications and screening process, where the TSA has arbitrarily and, in some cases, prejudicially, rejected a number of apparently well-qualified candidates. In April 2003, the TSA operated the first “prototype” FFDO class, populated with many pilots specifically chosen for their backgrounds in law enforcement and/or airline security operations. The intent was ostensibly to seek the pilots’ input in program development. Two pilots recommended for the class by a Congressional sponsor of the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act (APATA) – Captain Phillip Beall and First Officer [PILOT #2] – were excluded from the prototype class by the TSA. Beall had nearly 20 years of experience as a reserve law enforcement officer, and [PILOT #2] was a retired Marine Corps officer. Both had been outspoken advocates of the APATA. Congressional staffers confirmed that Beall and Aitken were rejected from the program by the TSA due to their high-profile advocacy of the armed pilot While the TSA purportedly sought the input of the carefully selected pilots in its prototype FFDO class in crafting the armed pilot program, it quickly became clear to participants that pilot concerns were largely ignored. Instead of using standard law enforcement protocols concerning weapons carriage, credentialing, and other operational issues, the TSA implemented procedures and policies viewed by many pilots as unsafe and inappropriate for the airline operating environment. All of the pilots in the hand-selected prototype class satisfactorily completed the FFDO training program in the eyes of Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) firearms instructors. Indeed, FLETC instructors praised the pilots as some of the most professional and competent candidates for federal law enforcement they had ever trained. Nevertheless, four pilots were dismissed by TSA managers prior to graduation – two of them only hours before being officially sworn in as FFDOs. One of the dismissed pilots, Dean Roberts, had an exemplary law enforcement background that included ten years experience as an armed agent/pilot for the Drug Enforcement Administration, the US Customs Service and the State Department. Roberts believes he was dismissed as a result of his outspoken objections to the nonstandard, unsafe program design. Robert Sproc, a former U.S. Air Force Captain who held a Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information clearance, was also dismissed after his airline supervisor told the TSA Sproc would not be a good fit for the program. Sproc had worked for his union, lobbying for the FFDO program, and his supervisor opposed the program. Nothing in Sproc’s background, and no other reference, corroborated his supervisor’s negative opinion. A third candidate, [PILOT #3]], was a reserve police officer for 20 years and a police training sergeant for six years. During his FFDO training, [PILOT #3] wrote a detailed evaluation of the FFDO program. Like Roberts, [PILOT#3] criticized the program’s operating procedures as nonstandard and unsafe. [PILOT#3] was not given a reason for his abrupt dismissal, but he suspects it was due to his negative evaluation of the FFDO program. A fourth candidate was dismissed as the result of an accusation of irresponsibility with a firearm in the past. The unsubstantiated charge was vehemently denied by the candidate himself and was, many months later, proven to be false. Unfortunately, the questionable applications and screening practices employed by the TSA have persisted beyond the prototype class. Indeed, the TSA developed a truly burdensome, often redundant applications process for vetting subsequent FFDO class candidates. In addition to submitting a 14-page application, FFDO candidates, who, by definition, have already passed the background investigation required under TSA 1544.230 to fly commercial airliners, are subjected to a second background investigation. Then candidates are required to travel to complete a computer-based psychological test at a contract vendor, and then travel yet again in order to undergo a clinical interview by a contract psychiatrist.2 The psychological evaluations for FFDOs are not based on, and bear little resemblance to, those used and accepted for many years to screen other federal law enforcement officers for reliability in critical situations. The CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Department of Justice and hundreds of state and local law enforcement agencies -- and, most notably, the Federal Air Marshal Service -- screen candidates using a common series of tools proven over hundreds of thousands of officers. Inexplicably, the TSA chooses not to use the established methodology applied to air marshals for vetting Federal Flight Deck Officers, even though both groups have an identical mission. Instead, TSA opts for an independently-developed model for FFDOs that is not proven and ignores accepted practice. A number of practicing psychiatrists have declined to participate in FFDO screening, citing an ethical objection to using a methodology inappropriate for this use. Moreover, other federal agencies (including the Federal Air Marshal Service) screen law enforcement officers using psychiatrists who have specializations and clinical training in police or law enforcement psychiatry. TSA does not require any such specialization of the contract psychiatrists hired The issue of psychological screening remains contentious, even among various pilot groups. Some pilots – including the majority of pilots that APSA represents – feel psychological screening for the FFDO program is largely redundant, serving only to raise costs and slow FFDO deployment. Commercial airline pilots are already among the most highly screened group of professionals. Pilots must regularly submit to FAA-mandated tests of their physical and mental health, as well as their flying skills and reliability in critical situations, through semi-annual check-rides, in order to maintain their flying status. Pilots are also subject to random substance abuse screening and one of the most rigorous systems of peer review. Commercial airline pilots regularly assess the flying skills, judgment, and state of mind of their fellow pilots – both informally (through the two-person cockpit) and formally (through periodic observation by FAA and Even pilots who hold the position that at least some additional psychological screening for the FFDO program may be prudent agree that the screening should not exceed that of air marshals and, most importantly, it must be carried out in good faith, using accepted practice and personnel experienced with law enforcement reliability screening. Unfortunately, there is ample evidence suggesting the TSA is abusing the psychological screening process to unjustly dismiss candidates. For example, some pilots report being told by the contract psychiatrist that the FFDO program is “Opt-In” instead of “Opt-Out.” This means the pilot is rejected by default and must convince evaluators at all levels of why he or she is qualified for the FFDO program, instead of the evaluators accepting the pilot by default and having to find sufficient reason to exclude him or her. Many pilots have been found “unfit” for the program based on this standard, and a large percentage have beendisqualified and told they could reapply in one year. Originally, one written test question asked, “Would you like to be a fighter pilot?” Many of the In late 2004, the Wilson Center for Public Research, a respected, professional polling corporation, polled a random sample set of 4400 Southwest Airlines pilots, asking how many had applied for the FFDO program. [REDACTED]% (+ 5%, given a 200-pilot sample set) reported they had applied to become FFDOs; suggesting roughly [REDACTED] Southwest pilots have applied for the program since the program began. But, in fact, only [REDACTED] Southwest Airlines pilots are actually serving as FFDOs. The data suggests as many as 60% of Southwest Airlines pilots who have applied to become FFDOs have not been deputized, either because they did not complete all facets of the burdensome application process, were rejected by the TSA, or are still languishing in the training pipeline. Even allowing for a small subset of very recent applicants just entering the pipeline, such an extraordinary failure rate points to manifest problems in the applications and screening processes. Among the large numbers of pilots found unfit to be FFDOs are current and former federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, firearms instructors, and “nuclear-cleared” military pilots, all with no adverse information in their backgrounds. One military pilot, who was found unfit by the TSA to carry a pistol in his cockpit, was a U.S. Air Force squadron commander who carried air-to-air missiles while patrolling the skies above New York City and Washington after the 9/11 attacks. In most cases, pilots found unfit to be FFDOs never know why they have been rejected. They are provided no contact information to check on their application’s progress, no means of correcting inaccurate information, and no recourse or review when their application is rejected or just simply ignored for months. Clinical psychiatrists who evaluate pilots are prohibited from discussing the evaluations with them. Many pilots have gone so far as to file Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to learn why they were judged unfit and some have contacted their state senators for assistance. In almost every case, the pilot ultimately receives only a copy of his or her original application, while the reasons for exclusion from the program, including the results of psychological testing, are redacted or classified by the TSA. The abrupt dismissal of four pilots from the first FFDO class, coupled with evidence that the TSA has misused psychological screening to reject a very high percentage of apparently well-qualified candidates from subsequent classes, has left a large number of pilots with the impression the applications process is not governed by the principles of fairness, objectivity, and impartiality. Further, the alarming prospect of being unfairly judged psychologically unreliable has had a chilling effect on FFDO volunteers, as pilots, quite reasonably, worry such a finding may threaten their livelihoods by making them suspect in the eyes of their employers, their colleagues and the FAA. The fact that unproven (and potentially indefensible) measures have been used to render such findings may subject TSA to legal liability as allowed under anti-discrimination statutes of employment law. Until the entire applications and screening process is seen as legitimate, pilots who would otherwise be willing to serve as FFDOs will be dissuaded from volunteering. Insufficient Training Facilities Another major shortcoming of the present FFDO program is the lack of ample, convenient sites for the appropriate training of pilot volunteers. The TSA originally conducted FFDO training at a small Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) located in Glynco, Georgia, but the training site was relocated to the FLETC facility in Artesia, New Mexico after only a few months. The move was attributed to scheduling and capacity constraints, but pilot groups were skeptical of this rationale. In fact, the Artesia site has roughly the same capacity as the Glynco facility – about 50 students. What makes Artesia profoundly different from Glynco is its remote location in the New Mexico desert, a 269 mile drive from the closest major airport. Pilots find it much more difficult to travel to the Artesia facility, often losing two full days for travel to and from training. As pilots must arrange uncompensated time off from their normal flying schedule to accommodate FFDO training, this additional travel time is seen by many as a real financial and logistical impediment. Those who have trained in Artesia give the facility and its outstanding instructors high marks. As a direct result of the flawed structural, managerial, and operational practices described in this document, the Artesia Training Center’s present capacity of [REDACTED] pilots per week is sufficient to train accepted FFDO candidates. However, reforming the program to address these flawed practices would result in a large influx of new volunteers – as many as 50,000-60,000 pilots, according to the same Wilson Center polling referenced above – overwhelming the capacity of Artesia and making the use of private training facilities to augment federal facilities an absolute necessity. Non-standard, Unsafe Weapons Carriage Protocols Pilots accepted into the FFDO program have had little difficulty satisfactorily completing the required training, a fact that speaks volumes to the seriousness with which pilot candidates take the instruction and the generally high level of aptitude of program participants. Once newly deputized FFDOs are deployed, however, TSA management applies several non-standard operating procedures to them which suggest just the opposite: that pilot FFDOs are somehow inferior to, or less responsible than, a wide range of other law enforcement officers. Indeed, the requirements, practices and procedures placed on FFDOs exist at no other federal law enforcement agency and are applied to no other federal law enforcement officer. Perhaps the most troublesome of these non-standard practices is the TSA requirement that FFDOs transport firearms in heavy steel lockboxes [“off-body,” in locked containers], and box or unbox the firearm every time the officer enters or leaves the cockpit for any reason. Again, this is unprecedented among federal officers. This rule means the FFDO must remove a loaded and holstered weapon from his or her belt and box it, then reverse the procedure after every landing, before every takeoff, and every time he or she leaves the cockpit for any reason – an average of 160 times a month. All other federal law enforcement officers carry firearms on their persons at their discretion, including FBI agents in cars and FBI and U.S. Customs pilots in airplanes. Pilots and firearms experts universally agree the lockbox requirement [off-body carriage] is manifestly unsafe. While other federal officers handle their weapons only twice a day, at the beginning and end of the day, FFDOs handle theirs an average of ten. It would be safer to handle the firearm as little as practicable. Moreover, the requirement to have the firearm off-body places the FFDO in the position of having their firearm more easily taken from them, and has resulted in temporarily and permanently lost and stolen FFDO weapons. Unbelting and boxing the weapon after landing and prior to opening the cockpit door also requires the FFDO to divert his attention during the critical taxi and parking/shutdown phase of aircraft operations. APSA has received reports of FFDOs having near-mishaps while removing the firearm, as well as situations where the lockbox [removing the weapon] has interfered with flight controls. Most alarming, some FFDOs have reported never unboxing the firearm during flight due to the cumbersome, potentially dangerous nature of the process, making rapid response to a hijacking impossible. The TSA also originally required that FFDOs place their weapons in the aircraft cargo compartment when the FFDO was not the duty pilot, subjecting the guns to the same airline baggage system that misroutes, delays and loses passenger luggage on an all too frequent basis. Pilots warned the TSA this practice was ill-advised at best. Indeed, for roughly one year while this requirement was in place, FFDOs filed hundreds of incident reports of weapons that had been mishandled or misplaced by airline baggage agents. Officers reported finding their bags, containing loaded guns, unattended in the jetway on arrival, or in baggage claim circling alone on the conveyor belt. In some instances, the bag containing the gun was simply no longer aboard the aircraft when the aircraft arrived, requiring the airline to search for the weapon across interim stops, and then the national baggage system. In a three-month period, during the Christmas season, 2003, approximately 275 FFDO weapons were temporarily lost or mishandled. APSA has confirmed that at least one [a number of] FFDO weapon have been permanently lost from the cargo hold while out of the officer’s control. After almost a year of receiving ‘lost weapon’ incident reports, the TSA finally changed the procedure to allow FFDOs to carry the lockbox [locked container holding the weapon] in the aircraft cabin. Nevertheless, a significant potential for loss or theft still exists, as long as the pilot must move his weapon from airport-to-airport, airplane-to-airplane, and city-to-city using a lockbox [off-body]. The TSA says it is justified in prohibiting FFDOs from carrying firearms outside the flight deck on their persons because their jurisdiction is limited to the flight deck. Even a cursory reading of the law reveals this is a misinterpretation. Additionally, state and local law enforcement officers may carry concealed firearms on their persons aboard commercial airliners, despite being well outside their jurisdictions. This same fact applies to federal officers, well outside their primary responsibilities. Department of Agriculture inspectors, for example, and over one hundred and thirty other federal agencies’ personnel, routinely carry firearms when flying. It makes little sense that a local deputy sheriff or a USDA meat inspector may carry a firearm aboard a flight, while the Federal Flight Deck Officer trained to protect the flight must leave his or her weapon in a box. Lack of Appropriate, Universally Recognized Credentials FFDOs appear to be the only group of law enforcement officers in the United States on either the local, state, or federal level denied the benefit and protection of standard law enforcement credentials. FFDOs are issued I.D. cards, but no metal badge. The lack of a metal badge – a universal symbol of authority – exposes the FFDO to a higher risk of ‘friendly fire’ incidents. Law enforcement officials are trained to identify each other by virtue of a badge, and in the high-stress and time-compressed environment of a tactical situation onboard an airliner, a tactical team member, or another law enforcement officer aboard, may shoot an armed FFDO without the ability to identify himself from a stand-off distance. The lack of a universally recognized emblem of law enforcement also presents serious problems should an FFDO be stopped on the way to work, carrying a loaded firearm. Without a badge of some fashion, a universally recognized demonstrator of authority to be armed, a state or local police officer may be unsure of the FFDO’s lawful authority to possess the weapon. The lack of the standard identification/badge combination also makes it more difficult to establish the FFDO’s authority to other aircrew members, airline management, FAA personnel, and airport security personnel. When pressed by FFDOs on the rationale behind its “no badge’ policy, the TSA indicated they were concerned pilots would abuse the privilege, using badges to “get out of traffic tickets.” Given the very serious potential consequences of not having appropriate, universally recognized credentials, most professional pilots find this argument patently offensive. FFDOs are also treated differently at airports than other federal officers. While all other federal law International Flights Remain Outside Scope of FFDO Protection The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act (APATA) allows for the possibility to extend the FFDO program beyond domestic flights to include flights originating or terminating outside the United States. “CARRYING FIREARMS OUTSIDE UNITED STATES- In consultation with the Secretary of While liberal agreements have been negotiated to allow federal air marshals to carry weapons to protect international flights, the Under Secretary has negotiated no such agreements for FFDOs. As such, no international flights are protected by FFDOs. Pilots flying international routes have been summarily rejected from the FFDO program because these agreements do not exist. These pilots have been disqualified from becoming FFDOs even if they occasionally fly domestic routes. They cannot reapply for the program for at least a year, even if their status changes the very next month. The de facto exclusion of all international flights from FFDO protection is particularly alarming, given that many international fights might be considered ‘higher risk’ than a great number of domestic routes. While the September11 attacks involved only domestic flights, international flights have proven attractive targets throughout the history of air terror. The sometimes less stringent security standards employed by aviation authorities outside the United States may increase the relative vulnerability of international flights in the future. FFDO Program Lacks Support from TSA and Airline Leadership The vast majority of commercial airline pilots believe all of the above-noted problems – from the Complaints to the TSA by pilots regarding the most problematic aspects of the program have thus far fallen on deaf ears. This lack of responsiveness by the TSA drove a group of FFDOs in early 2004 to call upon their Congressional representatives for assistance, hoping to force the agency to reform. In response to this discussion by FFDOs and members of Congress concerning program mismanagement, the TSA issued e-mails to FFDOs threatening them with dismissal from the program and possible fines for revealing “Sensitive Secure Information” (SSI). When the TSA’s threats became public, the agency immediately issued a second e-mail encouraging FFDOs to talk with Congress about the program. The incident epitomizes ongoing TSA recalcitrance on the issue of reform, and lends further credence to assertions the agency is generally antagonistic to the program and its participants. In April 2004, Senators Jim Bunning (R-KY), Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Conrad Burns (R-MT), and Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC), introduced legislation aimed at reforming the FFDO program -- a confirmation that the TSA was not running the program as Congress had originally envisioned when Congress passed the original armed pilots bill. Despite having such a distinguished set of bipartisan allies in Congress, pilots once again found their efforts to reform the FFDO program being undermined from inside the TSA and related agencies. Soon after the introduction of the Cockpit Technical Corrections and Improvements Act, Thomas Quinn, Director of the Federal Air Marshal Program, and a former manager of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, authored an internal departmental memo calling for a “strong, coordinated lobbying effort” against this aviation security legislation3. Mr. Quinn suggested FFDOs were given too much authority under the bill, because, among other things, they had not been trained to execute Regrettably, lack of support for the FFDO program appears to extend beyond the TSA to include most airline management. Almost every major airline CEO signed a letter objecting to the program when it was first proffered and only one airline has publicly supported the program. On the eve of the enabling legislation, one cargo airline’s management was successful in adding the word “passenger” to qualify the term “pilots” in the law, thus eliminating all cargo pilots from applying. Legislation to readmit cargo airline pilots to the FFDO program was passed almost a year later in response to a widely publicized stowaway incident on a cargo jet. Indeed, most airline policies discourage pilots from becoming FFDOs. For example, airlines are not required to provide their pilots time off (even unpaid) to attend FFDO training. Some airlines have refused to adjust a pilot’s schedule, even if the airline is adequately staffed, to accommodate training. Pilots must wait for, and use, vacation time, or simply resign their application, if they cannot schedule eight consecutive days off when an FFDO training class is offered. The Future of the FFDO Program The FFDO program will continue to suffer from a dearth of volunteers without dramatic change, thereby leaving the American commercial air transportation system without this most critical, cost-effective security enhancement. The vast majority of commercial airliners will remain as defenseless as they were on the morning of September 11, 2001, against the will of Congress, the American people and almost all airline pilots. This is especially disconcerting, since recent government assessments confirm terrorists still consider commercial airliners highly attractive targets. Moreover, even with the dramatic upgrades made in the area of passenger and baggage screening after September 11, the airport security system is still alarmingly porous. While airport screening failure rates have now been classified, members of Congress who have access to the data have publicly stated failure rates remain very high. An FAA Security Inspector recently stated his personal testing reflected screening failure rates of, “generally about 90-95%.”4 With screening failure rates so high, the issue is not if illegal contraband will make it on a commercial aircraft, but when and by whom. It is a near virtual certainty that at some point, some individual or group with malicious intent will successfully smuggle dangerous, potentially deadly items into the cabin of an airliner. Given current air marshal and FFDO deployment levels ([A SMALL FRACTION OF FLIGHTS]) and the fact fortified cockpit doors are not failsafe, the odds are disturbingly high that a targeted aircraft will be completely vulnerable to being commandeered and flown into a target, crashed, or shot down by the U.S. military to prevent further loss of life and destruction on the ground. APSA – and the thousands of pilots it represents – firmly believes substantially reforming the FFDO program to address the six major deficiencies outlined above can fundamentally alter this equation, greatly improving the odds for the passengers and crew on that flight that inevitably gets targeted. Conclusions and Recommendations Three and a half years after 9/11, only [A FEW THOUSAND] of our nation’s 90,000 commercial airline pilots are deployed as FFDOs. By our estimates, fewer than [3%]% of commercial airline flights are protected by a team of FFDOs, and fewer than [15%]have even a single armed pilot aboard. None of the thousands of commuting, deadheading and vacationing FFDOs who routinely travel in the cabin is permitted to act to defend against an attack on the flight deck. This is a far cry from the robust deterrent force envisioned by Congress, the flying public, and the vast majority of airline pilots who rallied around the cause of an armed pilot program in the wake of September. The program has languished, not because the threat has diminished, nor because pilots are no longer interested in stepping forward to do their part to prevent another national tragedy. Rather, the FFDO program falters under the weight of its own, flawed design. APSA encourages the Inspector General to interview a cross section of rejected FFDO applicants, deputized agents, and pilots who simply refuse to apply to the program. We are confident this exercise will substantiate all of the assertions put forth in this document. In short, the FFDO program is being undermined by the very agency charged with executing it, and pilots will not step forth in large numbers until the program is reformed and managed with the goal of success, not failure. In an era of competing fiscal priorities, it is also worth noting that reforming the FFDO program offers one of the best returns on taxpayer investment. If the FFDO program is operated according to standard procedure and existing resources are utilized, the initial cost to deploy 50,000 FFDOs would be roughly $165M (or one fifth the Federal Air Marshal Service’s annual budget). Thereafter, the program could be operated for only $15M per year (or 2% of the Federal Air Marshal Service’s annual budget). The Federal Air Marshal Service reportedly protects fewer than 2% of daily commercial airline flights. An improved FFDO program would protect 100%. The following specific recommendations for reforming the FFDO program were developed by APSA, in concert with airline pilots and pilots’ organizations, Federal Flight Deck Officers, police psychiatrists, aviation security experts, and experienced law enforcement officers with decades of field experience: Applications and Screening Recommendations
Training Recommendations
Weapons Carriage and Credentialing Recommendations
Recommendations for Coverage of Applicants Flying Internationally
Additional Recommendations
Contact Information Representatives of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance are available to answer questions or comments about this report or provide access to specific sources used in its compilation. Readers may contact Captain David Mackett, President, Airline Pilots Security Alliance, at 615-479-4140, or David_Mackett@secure-skies.org. *** |
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