The APSA Position on “Stun Guns”

• Stun guns have garnered great attention as weapons that may be introduced into airline cockpits in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001
• Law enforcement experts recognize that stun guns are an inadequate weapon to defend against multiple attackers that are motivated to the point of suicide.
• The new, strengthened cockpit doors will effectively “screen out” the single attackers that may be mentally unbalanced.  Any threat that is capable of breaching the cockpit door must be met with lethal force.  The lives of all on board the airliner and thousands on the ground are at stake.
• Giving airline pilots the option to choose a weapon to defend their airplane that is highly unlikely to work is bad policy and could cost lives.  The fighter airplanes that will be dispatched to destroy the airliner - when the pilots are murdered and terrorists have taken control - will be armed with lethal air-to-air missiles, not BB guns.  Military planners recognize that there is no conceivable situation in which a fighter pilot should shoot a BB gun at a target and they do not distract him with an inappropriate option.  The TSA should recognize that any threat that enters the cockpit must be met with lethal force and the presence of a stun gun could prove to be a tragic distraction.
• The TSA arms their own Federal Air Marshals with firearms, not stun guns.  They recognize the folly of bringing “a knife to a gunfight.”  Why is the TSA allowing for cockpits to be essentially unprotected, as they will be when a stun gun is the only option available to airline pilots in a life-and-death struggle for control of their airplane?  Why is the TSA endorsing the use of ineffective stun guns while at the same time obstructing arming pilots with firearms and making entry into the armed pilot program threatening and difficult for airline pilots?
• If the TSA’s true concern is for safety of the traveling public, they should stop wasting resources on weapons that wont work and focus their time and energy on those that will.  They should concentrate creating an armed pilot program that is simple, unthreatening to those that volunteer and that screens out the tiny number of pilots that may not be suitable, instead of assuming each volunteer is unsuitable until proven otherwise.  If, however, the TSA’s real goal is to create a behemoth government bureaucracy that is completely unaccountable, hostile to the rights of law-abiding Americans and hungry for limitless billions of taxpayer dollars, they are right on course.

Defending the Cockpit

DEFINING THE THREAT

When discussing the proper weapons for cockpit defense, it is imperative that participants in the discussion agree on the nature of the threat. Different threats dictate different responses and it is crucial that the weapon selected for cockpit defense is adequate for the anticipated attack. While varying degrees of danger exist, it is always wise to be prepared for the worst possible scenario, rather than face a situation inadequately prepared or incapable of dealing with the presented threat. To do otherwise has us fighting yesterday’s battles and places us in the same state of readiness that existed the morning of September 11th.

At APSA, we are convinced that the threat we must prepare for is clearly the threat of another attempt at a cockpit takeover and use of the airliner as a guided missile. The terrorist attacks of September 11th were the most successful terrorist attacks in human history. These attacks gained the attention of the entire world and pushed the economy of the world’s most powerful nation into recession. Commerce was effectively shut down as the nation’s airliners were grounded and, most importantly, the attacks permanently changed the way Americans live. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought unprecedented prestige to the perpetrators and there will be powerful motivation - for decades to come - for other groups to attempt to repeat this horrible scenario.

It is clear that we must assume that future September 11th style attacks will occur and must plan for that eventuality. In so doing, we can create a deterrent that may prevent attacks from happening in the first place. We must not underestimate the resolve of our enemies. We must put in place a powerful deterrent that will cause potential attackers to judge, without question, that the probability of success is so low as to not be worth the attempt. Simply hoping that no terrorist group will ever try another cockpit takeover is irresponsible, unrealistic and irrational when one considers the motivations of terrorists in today’s world.

WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE WEAPON FOR THE ANTICIPATED THREAT?

We are in agreement with the proponents of non-lethal weapons for cockpit defense insofar as it is clear that the cockpit is the place on the aircraft that must be defended. If the pilots lose control of the cockpit, the consequences will always be catastrophic. Those in favor of non-lethal weapons and those convinced that lethal force is required for cockpit defense agree that the cockpit must not be compromised. The only question is, what is the appropriate weapon?

The APSA proposal for providing airline pilots that volunteer for a rigorous screening, training and deputization program with firearms for cockpit defense is a very controlled, sensible and safe program. APSA advocates the much stronger cockpit doors that will be installed in the next two years and these doors will work in concert with the armed pilot concept. Even though these doors will not be impenetrable, they will significantly delay any attacker’s access to the cockpit. In all cases, APSA proposed Federal Law Enforcement Officers–Aviation (FLEO-A’s) will remain in the cockpit behind the reinforced cockpit door. Thus, the firearm would only be used when all other defensive measures have failed and killers are breaking down the cockpit door. In this scenario, with the lives of potentially thousands hanging in the balance, lethal force is warranted, justified, prudent and necessary.

Some aircraft threats, although serious and potentially life threatening, would not result in FLEO-A intervention. One example of this might be an attack on a flight attendant. When defending the cockpit, a threat that is inappropriate for the use of lethal force is any threat that does not have potential for cockpit takeover. To be more concise, if the threat is not in the cockpit, the FLEO-A will not become involved.

In light of the fact that a FLEO-A will never leave the cockpit to stop or prevent a crime, it is extremely unlikely that he would ever use lethal force inappropriately. Consider the case of a lone untrained attacker. It is very unlikely such a person will ever be confronted by a FLEO-A. Working alone, this attacker would be unable to maintain control of passengers and flight attendants while simultaneously trying to break into the cockpit. Passengers would very likely restrain such an individual while the pilots landed the aircraft at the nearest suitable airport.

Now consider the case of a trained terrorist team. Lethal force is clearly necessary to stop multiple suicidal attackers that would kill the pilots and use the airplane as a guided missile, but only if such attackers were successful in breaching the cockpit door. Meeting such attackers with anything other than an armed lethal response will only invite disaster.

CURRENT SECURITY MEASURES AND SCREENING

Failures of screening for weapons continue today and will always be a reality in any public accommodation. Handguns, knives, and explosives get on board aircraft with regularity, even since tighter screening tolerances were initiated post-September 11th. Many persons and vehicles have access to aircraft and it is clear that we cannot completely sterilize the cabin of a mass-transit system. Last month, a Captain and leading member of APSA flew an airplane that had been searched for weapons by his airline’s ground crew as well as the Federal Air Marshals who were on board. At the termination of the flight, a serrated, very sharp, six-inch hunting knife was found under one of the passenger seats. When he reported it to his airline, no one was surprised. Their reaction is very telling. At another airport an APSA board member watched as a janitor’s large cleaning cart was pushed through security with only a cursory look.

Even the FAA has tacitly acknowledged that current security measures do not adequately address airline security. Flights to and from Washington Reagan Airport require special flight procedures and enhanced security measures. Were our standard security procedures an assurance of safety, these unique steps would not be necessary.

FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS AND OTHER ARMED PASSENGERS

APSA strongly supports the Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program, but we must recognize that it is not a panacea. FAM’s can never be on anything more than a small minority of flights. More importantly, when FAMs or other armed passengers are aboard an airliner, they bring with them lethal weapons that could potentially be used against the cockpit

The FBI believes that terrorist teams in the U.S. work in groups of four to fifteen. Clearly, four to fifteen suicidal, trained and likely armed terrorists have the potential of overpowering two FAMs, or other armed individuals who may be aboard, thus gaining control of lethal weapons. Police use the rule of "one-level-greater-force:" That is, a police officer must employ one level greater force than his assailant to stop the assault. Since there is the realistic potential for pilots meeting hijackers armed with firearms, they need to be able to defend against that eventuality.

UNAUTHORIZED FIREARMS IN THE CABIN

Non-metallic firearms—invisible to Magnetometers—are available today overseas. Police departments in this country have already been briefed on their existence. Hijackers equipped with such firearms can today pass through our airport security system without being stopped. Terrorists who suspect they may be identified by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) for additional searches can arrange to have a non-selectee carry the weapons on board for them. One police officer that spoke with an APSA board member speculated that the passenger United Airlines caught in O’Hare with knives, pepper spray, and a stun gun might have been a mule for others on board the aircraft, or was at least practicing a dry run for that scenario. There are dozens of ways to get firearms on board an airliner ranging from smuggling them on board through an airport vendor’s truck to bribing a baggage handler to sneaking them through a security system designed for a public accommodation.

The media has reported on a number of firearms that have slipped through security and were successfully carried onto an airliner. Given the number of passengers and carry-on bags screened daily, even a miniscule failure rate can have disastrous consequences.

COCKPIT DOORS

"The Principle of the Door:" According to law enforcement trainers, given enough time, any door can be compromised. Boeing has stated that constructing an impenetrable cockpit door is not possible.

Boeing also has voiced its concerns over structural problems resulting from a sealed cockpit during a rapid cabin depressurization. Since a depressurization is most likely to occur aft of the cockpit, a sudden loss of cabin pressure requires the cockpit door to vent to equalize pressure. Boeing states that if cockpit doors are tightly sealed, as much as 6000 pounds of force could be applied to the cockpit floor during a cabin depressurization resulting in buckling of the cockpit floor and damage to or failure of flight control cables beneath it. Additionally, during flights of any significant duration, the cockpit door will need to be opened in flight.

Considering the truism that any door can be compromised given enough time and determination and the special technical problems associated with cockpit doors, we will never be able to depend upon cockpit doors to stop terrorist teams.

SECURITY PERIMETERS

The military does not consider an area "secured" unless it is defended from within. Defended means capable of repelling the expected attack. Today, the expected attack is from multiple, trained, armed, suicidal terrorists. Currently, airline pilots are completely incapable of repelling such an attack.

Security perimeters are normally established from the area to be protected outward. In aviation, we have worked backwards—the airport fence, the terminal with armed National Guardsmen, and last and most recently, bars across the frail cockpit doors. In APSA’s view we are securing everything but the intended target: the cockpit.

According to law enforcement and martial arts experts, a trained terrorist team can take control of an airliner cabin without the benefit of weapons. Once control of the cabin is gained, terrorists have until the airplane lands to access the cockpit, kill the pilots, and get control of the real weapon, which is the aircraft itself. Over some areas of the country, this can be a significant period of time. On over water flights, the hijackers will have literally hours to breach the cockpit door and gain control of the largest aircraft, each capable of carrying fifty or more tons of fuel and reaching targets thousands of miles distant. In other words, the airplanes that are the most desirable to highjack allow terrorists more time to commandeer them.

DEFENSELESS TARGETS AND THE COST OF FAILURE

In summary, today airline cockpits are the primary targets of a highly trained, well-funded and resourceful group of terrorists. Right now, these primary targets are incapable of being defended from within. As long as the pilots are alive and well, we will not relive September 11th. If we are unwilling to give highly trained pilots the ability to defend themselves with appropriate weapons for the anticipated attack, then we are deciding that we are willing to either relive the horrors of September 11th or watch a U.S. tactical aircraft shoot down an unarmed U.S. airliner. Arming pilots through the rational program proposed by APSA provides a final security measure prior to relying on Air Force fighters to do the unthinkable. Rather than viewing the issue as adding a new task to a pilot’s responsibilities, this should be seen as simply another facet of what professional pilots have always been trained to do: handle emergencies expertly with composure and skill.