1. If we make certain that no weapons are brought on board an airliner, why do the pilots need to be armed?
2. Pilots are busy flying the airplane, how can they be expected to defend their cockpits as well?
3. Why not just install a cockpit door that is impenetrable?
4. What if the terrorists take the pilot's firearm and use it against the crew?
5. Couldn't a gun fired in an airliner cause it to depressurize rapidly and or crash?
6. What about Stun Guns or Tasers? Would these be preferable to lethal force?
7. Should individual airlines be allowed to decide whether or not to participate in the FFDO program?
8. If the FFDO carries their weapon on their person to and from the airport, and in the terminal, does this represent an increased risk ?
9. Are FFDO's more likely to be targeted for crime because of their armed status?
10. Should firearms be stored in locked containers in the aircraft's cockpit? 
11. Why not leave the defense of the airplane to the Federal Air Marshals(FAM's)?
12. What is the appropriate firearm for the anticipated threat?

If we make certain that no weapons are brought on board an airliner, why do the pilots need to be armed?

Because it is impossible to assure that weapons won’t be brought aboard an airliner.  Service vehicles have access to secure airport areas and employee groups from mechanics and baggage handlers to operations agents and fuelers have access to airplanes.  A single chain link fence surrounds airport perimeters and airliners are parked largely unattended during nighttime hours.  Millions of passengers are admitted through security each day and there are multiple deadly weapons that defy detection.  A razor sharp, heavy plastic knife is just one example of a lethal weapon that is undetectable without a strip search.  Airlines are a public accommodation and security at public accommodations can never be airtight.  In even the most stringent environment, that of a penitentiary, inmates manage to smuggle weapons or fashion them from common items.  It is unrealistic to assume that determined terrorists will be unable to get a weapon on board an airliner and pilots need to be able to defend their cockpits against that threat.

Back to Top

Pilots are busy flying the airplane, how can they be expected to defend their cockpits as well?

As captains, we are charged with prioritizing problems and dealing with them in a logical order that ensures a safe operation.  In fact, our training is concentrated on making us experts in crisis management.  Whenever an emergency exists, standard airline practice requires the captain to designate a pilot who continues to fly while the other devotes his attention to handling the emergency.   Just as we train for combating onboard fires, so would we train to defeat a cockpit intrusion.  If terrorists were breaking down the cockpit door with the intention of murdering the pilots and using the airplane as a bomb, all would agree that this is an emergency of the highest priority.  If the pilots do nothing to stop the attack with finality and simply continue flying, they will soon be dead, as will all of the passengers, crew and possibly thousands of citizens on the ground. 

Back to Top

Why not just install a cockpit door that is impenetrable?

Because it is impossible.  Aircraft manufacturers have clearly stated that even the strongest possible door will not stop determined attackers.  Serious technical issues dealing with a loss of cabin pressure and practical issues concerning incapacitation or seizure of a pilot put limits on how strong the door can be.  A much stronger cockpit door than those that now exist is clearly required, but we cannot rely on any cockpit door to deter or prevent a cockpit takeover from a team of terrorists.  A significantly strengthened door will slow attackers down, giving an armed cockpit crew warning and preparation time to defend their airplane.

Back to Top

What if the terrorists take the pilot's firearm and use it against the crew?

"The taking of an armed officer's weapon is a situation faced by every armed LEO in the world. This does not deter the arming of properly trained officers nor should it stop the arming of properly trained pilots. Weapon retention is dealt with by teaching proper techniques and procedures and subsequently practicing these procedures during training. The question should not be what if the terrorists use the pilot's weapon against the crew, but rather what if the pilots do not have a weapon to defend themselves, their passengers and innocent people on the ground? Since FFDO firearms will only be used in the worst-case scenario when all other layers of security have failed, the presence of the firearms will never worsen the circumstance. On the contrary, it is the only measure capable of defeating the threat."

If terrorists board an aircraft with weapons or smuggle them on board, and they are the only armed persons on the aircraft, they are in charge and can do whatever they want. For those who worry that a terrorist might obtain a weapon from a pilot, it must be recognized that getting a firearm away from a trained FFDO would be very difficult. Ultimately, the essential question is this: if all preventative systems have failed and suicidal killers are breaking into the cockpit with the intent of killing the pilots and flying the airplane into a building, is not the situation made better if the pilots are armed and trained to offer a final line of defense of their aircraft and passengers?

Back to Top

Couldn't a gun fired in an airliner cause it to depressurize rapidly and or crash?

On May 2, 2002, Mr. Ron J. Hinderberger - Director, Aviation Safety Boeing Company - testified before the House Aviation Subcommittee “Commercial airplane structure is designed with sufficient strength, redundancy and damage tolerance that single or even multiple handgun bullet holes would not result in loss of the aircraft.”  He further stated that a bullet hole would almost certainly not cause a loss of cabin pressure. Even if it did, a loss of cabin pressure is a problem that pilots are trained to deal with quite easily.  The Federal Air Marshals have correctly judged that arming their agents with firearms does not present an undue risk.  Moreover, recalling that a FFDO would only use a firearm as a last resort, final line of defense, any outcome that may occur is preferable to having the airplane used as a guided bomb or shot down by a U.S. military fighter.

Back to Top

What about Stun Guns or Tasers? Would these be preferable to lethal force?

No.  We agree with advocates of stun guns and Tasers that the cockpit is the target of the terrorists and it must be defended.  However, proper weapon selection is crucial.  Law enforcement officers and stun gun/Taser manufacturers make it clear that this equipment should not be used against multiple attackers or attackers armed with knives or guns.  Stunning or “Tasing” a terrorist will render him partially disabled for the brief period that electrical current is being delivered to his body.  After that, recovery is virtually instantaneous and the attacker will be back in the fight.  Moreover, these devices can deal with a single individual only.  When confronted with a team of highly trained, armed and suicidal terrorists that have successfully penetrated every layer of security, pilots must have a firearm that will stop them, with finality, at the cockpit door.  Non-lethal force is not the answer to the problem presented by the new hijacking threat.

Back to Top

Should Individual airlines be allowed to decide whether or not to participate in the FFDO program?

Absolutely not.  If the airlines are allowed to opt out of the program, it is very unlikely that a significant number of pilots will ever be armed.  Intense lobbying by the ATA is the reason that the administration chose not to arm airline pilots and giving the airlines the option to participate is tantamount to having the fox guard the henhouse. 

 Further, according to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR’s), it is the Captain - not the airline - that is ultimately responsible for the safety of the airplane and its occupants:

 CFR14, FAR 91.3 (General Flight Rules)

(a)      The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

CFR 14, FAR 121.533 (Operating Rules, Air Carriers)

(d)   Each pilot in command [Captain] of an aircraft is, during flight time, in command of the aircraft and crew and is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crewmembers, cargo and the airplane.

(e)   Each pilot in command [Captain] has full control and authority in the operation of the aircraft, without limitation…

Clearly, by Federal Regulation, it is the Captain that bears final authority and responsibility for the airliner and its occupants.  It is logical and proper to give the Captain the final say in the matter of carrying a firearm for defense of his/her passengers and crew.

The FFDO proposal calls for the selection, screening, training, deputization, and oversight of FFDO’s to be accomplished solely by the federal government, removing the airlines, and any liability issues for them, from the picture.  Airlines are not allowed to decide whether or not to allow Federal Air Marshals on their aircraft and by the same reasoning they should not be allowed to decide whether or not to participate in the FFDO program.  Airline pilots are certificated by the Federal Government, independent of their airline employers, to fly airplanes and the FFDO program would provide pilots with a similar federal government credential to protect their cockpits. 

Finally, airlines that choose to participate in the FFDO program would enjoy a strong deterring effect against terrorist attacks while airlines opting out would be a much more likely target for terrorists.  Government regulatory authorities have consistently rejected the notion that the traveling public should be subjected to varying levels of safety, depending upon the airline they happen to choose.  This strong tradition of service to the American people should continue, allowing the traveling public to choose an airline with confidence that the government has fulfilled its role in ensuring that all airlines meet the highest safety and security standards.

Back to Top

If the FFDO carries their weapon on their person to and from the airport, and in the terminal, does this represent an increased risk?

A.     All FFDO's will be screened, trained and deputized as federal law enforcement officers, authorized to carry concealed weapons.  The alternative of storing firearms at airport facilities gives potentially less responsible employee groups access to firearms.  Additionally, airport storage adds an unneeded level of complexity to the program and places a supply of firearms at a known – and probably unguarded – location at the airport.  Federal agents from many agencies including Department of Agriculture, Department of Education, FBI, Secret Service, HUD, HHS and others, as well as uniformed police officers and National Guard Soldiers, are authorized to carry firearms in secure airport areas. These agents, uniformed police officers and soldiers all carry firearms with them through airport facilities and terminals, and, in many cases, on board airplanes, without problems or undue risk.  Armed airline pilots can be expected to do the same. 

Back to top

Are FFDO's more likely to be targeted for crime because of their armed status?

FFDO’s would be thoroughly trained in firearms retention by an appropriate federal agency and would be well prepared for the responsibility of carrying a firearm.  Criminals historically have been reluctant to victimize law enforcement officers because of their status and FFDO’s would benefit from that disinclination.  Uniformed police officers are not routinely assaulted because of their armed status and it is unreasonable to believe that FFDO’s would be either.  The fact that a law enforcement officer could potentially be the target of a crime because of his possession of a firearm has never been seriously considered to be a valid reason for disarming law enforcement officers.   It should not be considered a reason to deprive the traveling public of a last resort, final line of defense against the terrorist threat.

Back to top

Should firearms be stored in locked containers in the aircraft's cockpit?

Storing firearms in the cockpit increases opportunities for loss or theft of the firearms, requires thousands of unguarded locked containers and geometrically increases the number of people who will handle a weapon and the number of times it will change custody.  Each airline would be required to train ground employees in weapons handling, weapons and ammunition storage, locked container installation and maintenance, firearms maintenance, and to maintain a chain of custody of hundreds (or thousands) of firearms.  All this would create liability problems for the airlines, which is their prime objection to armed pilots.  Even if the airlines were willing to store firearms in cockpits, the cockpits are very crowded and accessible places to mount gun safes could be difficult to find.  Many people have access to cockpits, particularly during night layovers, creating an opportunity for theft of the firearms.  A firearm missing from a cockpit locked container would constitute a security breach that may require evacuation of the passenger terminal. 

Finally, practice with a personal weapon—strongly recommended by firearms instructors—would be impossible if the firearms are cockpit stored.  In order to maintain the highest standards of safety and deterrence, as well as the greatest possible level of cockpit defense, firearms should be issued to carefully screened and trained volunteer pilots.  These pilots will maintain proficiency with the firearms and be responsible for retention, security and maintenance of this personal equipment that they are individually responsible for. 

Back to top

Why not leave the defense of the airplane to the Federal Air Marshals (FAM’s)?

The existence of the FAM program is a clear acknowledgement that security screening alone can not be relied upon to keep terrorists with weapons off of airliners and the fact that FAM’s carry firearms is evidence that a firearm is the proper weapon for defending against the terrorist threat. 

FAM’s are an important layer in the multi-layered defense system that APSA advocates, but there are weaknesses to this layer that must be confronted:

-         The FAM program is extremely expensive.  The 10,000 FAM’s planned by the TSA will cost over a billion dollars.

-         10,000 FAM’s will only be able to protect less than 10% of the flights.  Your flight will rarely have a FAM on board, but your flight will always have at least two pilots on board.  It would take over 100,000 FAM’s to protect each commercial flight and the cost would be astronomical.

-         Currently, nine months after the September 11th attacks, there are less than 1,000 FAM’s and they are protecting less than 1% of the flights.

-         The FAM program has been fraught with a very high turnover rate.  Motivated law enforcement professionals are finding that riding in the back of an airliner is not the exiting career they had hoped for.

-         Recent reports have indicated that proficiency standards have been lowered in order to graduate a greater number of FAM’s.

-         FAM’s are not supermen.  They will carry their guns in the passenger cabin where it will be much easier for a team of trained terrorists to capture a FAM’s gun than it would be to get a gun from a FFDO that is locked behind a strengthened cockpit door.

If there is a FAM on board and he/she is able to contain a hijacking threat, then the FFDO pilots will not become involved and they will concentrate on landing as soon as possible.  However, if a FAM is not on board or is compromised, when the terrorists break through the cockpit door the pilots must be able to offer a final line of defense.

Back to top

What is the appropriate firearm for the anticipated threat?

The cockpit is the place on the aircraft that must be defended. If the pilots lose control of the cockpit, the consequences will always be catastrophic. Those in favor of non-lethal weapons and those convinced that lethal force is required for cockpit defense agree that the cockpit must not be compromised. The only question is, what is the appropriate weapon?
APSA welcomes the stronger, newly installed cockpit doors and these doors work in concert with the armed pilot concept. FFDOs will remain in the cockpit behind the reinforced cockpit door. A FFDO will only use a firearm when all other defensive measures have failed and terrorists are inside the cockpit. In this scenario, with the lives of potentially thousands hanging in the balance, lethal force is legal, justified, prudent and necessary.
On September 11, terrorists operated in trained teams. Lethal force is clearly necessary to stop multiple suicidal attackers that would kill the pilots and use the airplane as a guided missile, if they are successful in breaching the cockpit. Meeting such attackers with anything other than an armed lethal response will only invite disaster.

Back to top