United States Congress
Committee on Small Business
Chairman Sam Graves

Subcommittee Hearing:
“A Small Business Component to the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program; It’s A Win-Win Strategy”
January 15, 2004

Prepared remarks by Mr. Dean C. Roberts, Commercial Airline Pilot and former federal officer:

“Chairman Graves and members of the sub committee:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the full implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer(FFDO) program and the positive impact of a small business component:

My name is Dean Roberts, and during the last 23 years, I’ve been involved with the U.S. military, federal law enforcement aviation and firearms training. Before flying for Southwest Airlines, I was a pilot for the U.S. Customs Service, and a special agent/ pilot and firearms instructor for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), based at the U.S. Embassy in Lima Peru. I’m a graduate of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Glynco, Ga., as well as the FBI Academy, Quantico, Va. My background in firearms, and flying aircraft while armed, is extensive; however, they’re numerous pilots in the industry with similar backgrounds that want nothing to do with the FFDO program--as TSA’s mandate is flawed.

April 2003, I attended the first FFDO class; I was also one of four pilots that were dropped from training. In my case, I was eliminated only one hour prior to graduating without explanation. When pressed for answers by my airline on why I was dropped from training, TSA said, “I was dropped because I did not complete the course.” That’s the type of double-talk TSA has engaged in since day one of this program. I’m sure my work on the pilot-working group, and my exposing flaws and unworkable policies, led to my dismissal from training. TSA’s staff that oversaw the first class wasn’t interested in hearing about problems within the program.

I’m not testifying as a representative of any business or organization--I’m testifying as a concerned commercial airline pilot.

August 2002, it became obvious that the FFDO program was going to become reality. I was asked by my pilot union to become part of a pilot-working group, joined with several other airlines. This working group was tasked to develop policies and procedures that would facilitate the armed pilot into daily airline operations. My background in federal law enforcement and firearms training, has prepared me uniquely qualified to provide meaningful input in this area.

November 2002, the FFDO program became reality. The pilot-working group met with TSA in early December. From our very first meetings with TSA it was evident that they already had a policy in place--they weren’t receptive to input from pilots. However, we repeatedly offered suggestions with a positive attitude, hoping that the program would become more functional. Our recommendations were rejected outright--without even so much as a review, or discussion of them. TSA’s meeting was eyewash, and at times, there were heated discussions. When it became obvious that TSA was overstepping its mandate, and imposing policy that was not in the legislation, TSA’s staff attorney told us “he understood the legislation and he was interpreting the legislation for TSA.” Additionally, he said that he would do so in such a way, “that no pilot in his right mind would volunteer.” This is one story of many that pilots in the pilot-working group, had contend with in the months leading up to the first FFDO class.

February 2003, the pilot-working group received TSA’s final policy. Upon our review, we determined that the FFDO program as TSA was imposing [it] on the pilots, would not work as Congress intended. We found that TSA’s final policy minimized pilot participation, just as TSA wanted. When the pilot group voiced concerns over TSA’s policies, we were told that, for the most part, the policies were “in stone and would not be changed,” especially the method of carrying the weapon.

TSA’s policies are what bring us here today. Just as TSA wanted, pilot participation in this program has been minimal--no matter what TSA may say publicly. At my airline, eight out of 10 pilots that are interested in the program will not volunteer now. The application process, the outrageous and unnecessary policies regarding transportation and handling of the weapon, inconvenient and remote training located now in New Mexico--are reasons why pilots are not joining the FFDO program. TSA has had an army of attorneys pour over every aspect of this program, which has only perpetuated in a delay. TSA’s practices have impended, and obstructed pilot participation.

If this FFDO program is to succeed as Congress envisioned it would, and provide a significant level of deterrent to future terrorist attacks, then Congress must address these issues immediately.

First, the application and screening process is unnecessary. Currently, pilots are required to fill out a 13-page application. That’s longer than any airline application; it’s longer than any government application that I’ve ever filled out as a federal law enforcement officer. This is unnecessary, but an example of how TSA erects roadblocks. Pilots employed by major airlines should be eligible for this program, as soon as a criminal history check is completed, which should only take a matter of minutes.

Next, TSA’s mandate of psychological testing conducted by outside industry contractors is unnecessary, and redundant; airline pilots are required to submit to, and pass a medical examination by an FAA-approved flight surgeon every six months. This medical exam is more than adequate and should satisfy the TSA. TSA’s outlandish policy and gimmickry on this issue, needs to be eliminated by Congress immediately. TSA claims that a pilot, who shoots an attacker, must then be able to land the aircraft. TSA claims that not all pilots possess this ability. Will TSA psychological testing methods separate those who are capable of shooting and landing aircraft, from those that aren’t? The answer is no. Airline pilots train constantly for emergencies; even if a pilot had to use the weapon to defend the cockpit, there’s another pilot perfectly capable of landing the aircraft in the seat right next to him or her. This testing goes beyond what is normal, or accepted in law enforcement. I was never required to submit to these tests during the application process for two separate federal agencies.

Next, we must address the TSA-method of carrying and transporting the weapon. Their current policies in this area are unsafe; they don’t conform to accepted law enforcement flying armed protocol--it’s dangerous. TSA’s current policy puts the custody and security of the weapon in question, which has resulted in weapons being misplaced daily. TSA has used this ruse in hopes of deterring pilot participation in the FFDO program.

TSA has dragged its feet on this program for almost two years. Pilot training has been slow; since pilot participation is minimal because of TSA’s polices, TSA is able to claim seats are going empty in its weekly FFDO training classes. I suggest to you that if TSA were forced to implement this program as Congress envisioned, the number of pilots volunteering for the program would be so great that TSA would be forced into contracting much of the training out to the private sector, such as Gunsight training center in Paulden, Ariz., and others around the country.

TSA has not made participating in this program inviting. In fact, they’ve gone out of their way to make it as problematic as possible. They’ve reinvented the wheel in every aspect of this program; the result has been minimal pilot participation, just as the TSA wanted. One would think that TSA would welcome “free” help in securing the nations commercial aircraft. Instead, TSA views airline pilots as a threat to future manning, and has chosen to play politics over providing an effective deterrent to future terrorist attacks.

It’s my hope with the help of this sub committee and the assistance of your fellow legislators in Washington, pressure can be put on the obstructionist at TSA. Individuals like John Moran, Frank Scrosky and Tom Quinn need to be removed from positions of power over this program. The program needs people who will work us, not against pilots.

I believe that if this program were implemented as Congress envisioned, the number of pilots wanting to participate, would require that TSA enlist the services of private training facilities to keep up with the training demands. I only hope that another 9-11 type of incident is not the catalyst for change at TSA. 

Sincerely,

Dean C. Roberts