Airliners offer a very "soft" target to potential terrorists. Since the 1970’s, all passengers have been screened to ensure that weapons were not carried aboard an aircraft. Since late 1987, pilots have undergone the same screening. The result is a virtual guarantee to terrorists that if they can bring any kind of weapon on board, they will be the only armed persons on board and will be, in fact, in command of the aircraft. As we have seen, the weapon can be small, easily concealable and seemingly innocuous. On September 11th, terrorists used box-cutters and small knives. Sharp, heavy ink pens, hair accessories, plexi-glass and plastic weapons are a few examples of items that could be used to hijack an airliner.

Security can and should be improved, but we must recognize that even the best security is limited and imperfect. Airline travel is a public accommodation; it is in fact mass transit. Gaining access to an airliner is never going to be as difficult as gaining access to a sensitive building on a military installation and any security system we build will have to recognize the public nature of airline travel. Even security systems on military bases have been breached and clearly, any system at our nation’s airports will not be impenetrable. Additionally, increased security measures serve to offer an even greater assurance to terrorists that if they can get a weapon on board an airliner, there will be no one there who will be able to offer any significant resistance. By strengthening security without "hardening" the airliner target, we may ourselves feel safer while actually making the airliner a more attractive target to terrorists.

APSA proposes that providing the pilots of commercial airliners with firearms and firearm training would be a simple, effective, inexpensive and sensible way to harden the airliner target. Carefully selected guns and ammunition would provide airline pilots with a last resort, final line of defense to keep hijackers out of the cockpit.

Airline pilots are among the most highly trained and carefully screened professionals in the world. They are routine and procedure oriented, level headed and stable. The nature of our job requires us as airline pilots to make critical decisions in extremely time-compressed environments. Airline pilots perform expertly, day after day, in stressful - and sometimes life and death - circumstances. Every person that ever boards an airliner places their trust in the pilots and airline pilots earn that trust every day by safely operating tens of thousands of flights. It is illogical not to trust these pilots with firearms to be used in defense of their passengers and their aircraft.

Each pilot authorized to carry a firearm in the cockpit would be a volunteer, would have to pass a rigorous training program and would be deputized as a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) upon completion. Even though these pilots would be trained in law enforcement, they would not be expected or authorized to stop or prevent criminal activity that remains isolated to the passenger cabin. The sole purpose of the weapon would be to deny cockpit access to hijackers and it would be used only in the most extreme cases where the cockpit door has been broken down and killers are entering the cockpit.

No one is more aware of the seriousness of a discharge of a firearm in flight than the pilots and no one is in a better position to judge whether the use of a firearm is prudent in a given situation. Careful selection of ammunition will reduce the risk to the aircraft and its occupants, but we must remember: if terrorists gain access to the cockpit then all on board are lost as well as the probable loss of thousands of lives on the ground. Proper training would emphasize that the firearm is to be used only as a last resort, final line of defense to keep hijackers from entering the cockpit. No outcome from shooting a terrorist trying to break into the cockpit will be as bad as the horrific devastation we observed on September 11th, when the pilots were unarmed and unable to defend their cockpits.

If terrorists board an aircraft with weapons or smuggle them on board, and they are the only armed persons on the aircraft, they are in charge and can do whatever they want. For those who worry that a terrorist might obtain a weapon from a pilot, it must be recognized that getting a firearm away from a trained FFDO would be very difficult considering that the pilots remain locked in the cockpit and would be forewarned by the loud attempts to break down the cockpit door. Ultimately, the essential question is this: if all preventative systems have failed and suicidal killers are breaking into the cockpit with the intent of killing the pilots and flying the airplane into a building, is not the situation made better if the pilots are armed and trained to offer a final line of defense of their aircraft and passengers?

Others have said that carrying guns aboard airliners should be left to the air marshals. We agree that any air marshal on board should handle any hijacking situation that remains isolated to the passenger cabin, but it is very unlikely that air marshals will be on board and it is questionable how effective they can be against the new hijacking threat. Even if terrorists are unlucky enough to attempt to hijack a flight with air marshals on board, a team of trained and determined terrorists bent on suicide could overwhelm them. Taking a gun away from an air marshal in the passenger cabin would be much easier than getting firearms from well trained FFDOs who are locked in the cockpit. Only by gaining access to the cockpit can terrorists use the airplane as a weapon, so they must be denied access to the cockpit at all costs. Pilots must be armed to provide a last resort, final line of defense for their passengers, their aircraft and innocent citizens on the ground.

Finally, some have suggested that strengthening the cockpit door will solve this problem. We agree that the cockpit door needs to be stronger, but that alone will not be enough to prevent future attacks. There are limits on how strong and heavy the cockpit door can be due to serious technical issues brought forth by aircraft manufacturers. Determined attackers will be able to defeat even the strongest of cockpit doors, but a substantially strengthened cockpit door will work in concert with an armed cockpit crew providing the pilots with a clear, advanced warning that a serious threat is imminent.

As airline pilots, we are entrusted with an aircraft valued at many millions of dollars, thousands of gallons of jet fuel and the un-quantifiable value of the lives of our passengers. Today’s final line of defense for the new hijacking threat involves the unthinkable specter of a U.S. military fighter jet shooting down a defenseless passenger airliner. A more reasonable line of defense prior to that horrendous measure would be to establish the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program and provide these pilots with the equipment and training necessary to defend our passengers, crew and airplane.